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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the dynamics of welfare by studying the persistence and transition of 
poverty risk, social transfers, employment and unemployment in the four European Country 
Clubs as defined by Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) and Bertola et al. (2001). We model their 
evolution in a multistate Markov process for proportions of aggregate data and estimate the 
transition matrix by adopting a Bayesian approach under inequality constraints and Monte 
Carlo Integration. Our approach uncovers the entire empirical posterior distribution of 
persistence and transition probabilities, for which statistical inference is readily available. The 
results show high persistence in unemployment rate in the Anglo-Saxon social club, whilst 
regarding social expenditures the four identified social clubs converge to two, the Nordic with 
the Continental club and the Anglo-Saxon with the Southern club. The half life statistics show 
fast pace across all variables of interest. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over recent years the European Union (EU) shows strong economic 
dynamism as depicted by its inclusion among the world’s most productive, 
competitive and innovative economies. Both the single market and the single 
currency, the euro, have assisted this dynamism and the creation of a more integrated 
economic area. Yet, if the economy of the EU is compared to the US economy a 
productivity gap emerges. Attempts to bridge this gap focus mainly on structural 
reforms. The Lisbon strategy, launched in March 2000, served this purpose, setting a 
ten-year time table to make the EU the world's ‘most dynamic and competitive 
economy’. Though it proved rather sluggish in the beginning this strategy seems 
recently to bear some fruits, in particular after its re-launch and refocus towards 
growth and jobs in 2006. The re-launch recognises that a necessary condition to 
successfully implementing structural reforms that would enhance economic efficiency 
and bridge the productivity gap is to raise social welfare and to create jobs, as both are 
among the basic prerequisites of building strong social consensus in favour of the 
reforms (European Commission, 2006b).  
 
However, social welfare presents symptoms of chronic heterogeneity across 
EU Member-States, raising uncertainties over the final outcome of the Lisbon 
strategy. This heterogeneity of national social policies on employment and the income 
distribution has caused some heated discussions among policy makers and economists 
alike, leading some countries within the EU to call for protectionist measures, 
including barriers to cross-border trade, labour, and investment flows (European 
Commission, 2005a). This was the outcome of a growing scepticism in some 
countries in EU regarding the recipients of their social policies and their ability to 
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safeguard relatively high and evenly shared living standards among their citizens (see 
European Commission, 2006b).  
 
A possible solution, other than resorting to protectionism, would have been to 
achieve a common understanding, a coordination of national policies across EU that 
would attempt to bridge the differences in social welfare in EU. For this to happen 
though a necessary precondition is that a convergence in social welfare takes place 
across EU Member States. However, given the soft coordination of social policies in 
Europe convergence may prove a task of high order.  In many aspects a common EU 
social welfare policy would have been a solution, yet this proposition at the present is 
quite unrealistic that resembles utopia, leaving harmonisation across EU various 
social welfares as the only realistic option (European Commission, 2006a). 
 
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate integration in 
social welfare in EU. Moreover, we follow a club analysis that fits the stylised 
heterogeneity within the EU in terms of social policies (see Bertola, 2006). To this 
end our analysis identifies if a process of integration between the various social 
welfare clubs exists. The notion of the formation of different social systems, mirroring 
at different social clubs, first appears in the Espring-Andersen (1990), followed by 
Bertola et al. (2001). Similarly, we identify four ‘social welfare” clubs within the EU-
15: the Nordic club, the Continental club, Anglo-Saxon club and last the Southern 
club.  
 
Our methodology follows Quah (1993) and Mamatzakis and Fousekis (2007) 
who estimate transition probabilities matrices to describe the migration from a 
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particular social club to any other. To this end, the presence of high transition 
probabilities would imply a process of integration in terms of social welfare across 
EU. In case that disaggregate data are available, robust estimation of these 
probabilities can be trivially performed by calculating the proportion of objects, which 
migrate from one social club to another. However, it is often the case that these 
individual transitions cannot be observed or simply are not available to the analyst or 
policy maker. For example, the variables such as the risk of poverty and social 
transfers both fall into this category, for which Eurostat provides aggregate data. Yet, 
a solution could be to model the evolution of poverty risk and social transfers with 
respect to broad European social clubs using Markov Chains for proportions of 
aggregate data. Estimation of the transition matrix can be easily performed vias least 
squares with equality constraints. However, this approach goes back to the work of 
Miller (1952), Lee et al (1970) and MacRae (1977), for which the least squares 
estimator of the transition probabilities under inequality constraints has unknown 
distribution, thus preventing statistical testing. In this paper we shall adopt a Bayesian 
approach as in Christodoulakis (2007), which utilises Monte Carlo Integration (MCI), 
proposed by Kloek and van Dijk (1978) and van Dijk and Kloek (1980). In this 
respect our approach uncovers the entire empirical posterior distribution of transition 
probabilities, for which statistical inference is readily available. Furthermore, the 
Bayesian MCI approach performs well in cases of very small samples as shown in 
Christodoulakis (2008). 
  
The contribution of this paper is, thus, twofold. First, we study process of 
integration among identified social clubs, using the dynamics of poverty risk, social 
transfers, employment and unemployment rates through a Markov process and a 
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largely unexplored EU data. Second, we employ a Bayesian estimation method for the 
transition matrix under inequality constraints within a Monte Carlo Integration, thus 
uncovering the entire empirical posterior distribution of transition probability 
matrices.  
In what follows, section 2 presents the data and the institutional framework, 
while section 3 reports the methodological framework. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, while section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE  OF EU 
 
 
 The notion of forming different social welfare systems first appears in the 
Espring-Andersen (1990), followed by Bertola et al. (2001) that identify four different 
social welfare clubs within the EU-15: the first club includes the Nordic countries, 
namely Denmark, Finland and Sweden, together with Netherlands that traditionally 
endorses a generous welfare system accompanied by strong active labour market 
policies and high unemployment insurance benefits, aiming at full employment. The 
second club includes Continental counties, which are Austria, Belgium, France and 
Germany, and it has lower, than the first club, public social expenditures as pensions, 
health services and unemployment benefits are primarily financed by contributions, 
while it counts on a centralised wage negotiation system with rigid employment 
protection legislation to achieve full employment. The third club is based on the 
Anglo-Saxon model of the UK and Ireland, where public social expenditures and 
unemployment insurance benefits are low, labour markets are not regulated and there 
exist little employment protection. Lastly, the club of Southern countries, including 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, has the lowest level of public social expenditures as 
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the government is not the main contributor in the social welfare, where family still 
plays the dominant role.  
Given the soft coordination in social welfare policies in Europe, see Bertola 
(2007), one need to assess whether process of integration in the national policies takes 
place. In turn, national governments address the problems associated with income 
inequality and poverty through measures of poverty risk, unemployment and social 
transfers. Thus, we opt for those social expenditure transfers to investigate for 
integration in social welfare in EU. In addition, we employ similar analysis for the 
employment and unemployment rates. Labour market dynamics are of particular 
importance for combating poverty and social exclusion. This has been widely 
recognised in EU by the recent launch of Social Policy Agenda for Europe, (see 
European Commission, 2005b). The Social Agenda for Europe prioritises the 
improvement of quality and productivity at work, the strengthening of social cohesion 
that would attract and retain unemployed in employment, thus raising labour supply. 
It also seeks the modernisation of social protection systems.  
 
 Given the plurality of social welfare systems in EU, prior to the empirical 
analysis we need to be able to facilitate cross-country comparisons of social 
expenditure. Thus, the first step is to adopt a formal definition of the variables of our 
interest for testing the integration process of social welfare in EU. Based on the 
definition of OECD social expenditure includes the benefits, which includes also 
financial contributions, to households and individuals so as to assist their welfare in 
case of adverse events.  This definition is adopted by the Eurostat (see Eurostat, 
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2006), our source of data, in the the European System of integrated Social Protection 
Statistics (ESSPROS) as redefined in 1996.3  
 Moreover, public social expenditure includes cash benefits such as pensions, 
maternity payments, and social assistance. In fact, about half of the public social 
expenditure refers to pension expenditures. Of course there exist other social transfers 
in terms of social services like, childcare, care for the elderly and disabled, while tax 
exemptions also serve as social transfers as they could treat favourably families with 
children, expenditures to private health plans. 4  
 
In this study due to data availability issues we include the following countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. This group of countries 
would be referred as EU-15. Then, four social clubs are defined so as to provide an 
analysis of the underlying distribution dynamics, referring to an evolving cross-
sectional distribution over time and its persistence and transition characteristics 
between these clubs. 
 
Diagram 1 shows the cross-sectional average of the social protection benefits 
transfers as percent of GDP other than in kind for each year of the sample. Average 
social benefits increased rapidly from 1990 to 1994 but followed a downward trend 
for a prolonged period of time, from 1993 to 2000. Since 2000 this trend appears to be 
                                               
3
 At the outset, it is worth noting that there exists no universally accepted definition of the scope of 
social protection. 
4  Social spending is an aggregate of all (or a group of) social benefits. It does not include contributions 
and other payments by households that finance social programmes. Such payments are considered to be 
‘social contributions’ although they are an expenditure item from the perspective of the contributor. 
Social expenditure or social spending also does not include wages and salaries. 
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reversed, but stabilizing at lower level than the one of 1993. Given that it is well 
evident that income inequality has been increasing over the period considered in this 
study (see Bertola 2006 and 2007), the depicted decline of social protection benefits 
have an impact on income inequality and poverty. It is also worth noting that the 
period of declining social protection benefits coexisted with the period of the required 
nominal economic convergence prior to the adoption of the single currency, the euro. 
It is, therefore, of interest to examine whether there has been also a convergence in 
terms of social protection benefits in Europe over this period. 
Diagram 1: Social Protection Benefits (as percent of GDP). 
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 Source: Eurostat. 
 
 The main objective of the social benefits is to reduce the risk of poverty. 
According to the Eurostat classification, the risk of poverty rate is calculated on the 
basis of the household income received by all household members.  Based on this 
definition the risk of poverty rate refers to the individuals that line in households 
where equivalised income is bellow the threshold of 60% of the national equivalised 
median income before and after social transfers. Of course having an income below 
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this 60% threshold is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of classifying an 
individual as being poor, given that is difficult to account all instances that some basic 
needs in an individual’s everyday life are scarce or limited due to income constraints, 
like access to health, education services. As a result, the Eurostat indicator is referred 
to as a measure of poverty risk  
 Diagram 2 bellow shows the risk of poverty rate before and after social 
transfers over the sample period. There exist an apparent strong resilience in both 
risks of poverty, though without social transfers such as unemployment pay, public 
assistance, housing allowance or children’s allowance, the risk of poverty in the EU-
15 would have been 10% higher. Nevertheless, the risk of poverty remains quite 
substantial after the transfers, above 15 percent of the EU-15 population in 2006, 
around 44 million people.   
Diagram 2: Risks of poverty after and before social transfers. 
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An analysis of social expenditure and poverty risks should be complemented 
by the dynamics of labour market. The re-launch of the Lisbon strategy acknowledges 
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the interaction between poverty and employment, aiming at boosting jobs. This 
perception is also shared by the by many EU citizens. A recent Eurobarometer (2007) 
survey reports results that show a wide spread opinion among EU citizens that 
poverty is a widespread problem that affects the majority of people to some extent, 
whilst citizens believe that in the area where they live one person in ten lives in 
situations of extreme poverty. It is also of interest to note that, based on the 
Eurobarometer (2007), long-term unemployment is the most frequently quoted cause 
of poverty (35%), followed by current work not paying enough (34%) and social 
benefits or pensions not being high enough (33%).  
 
Thus, we extend our analysis so as to access whether employment and 
unemployment rates show some similar dynamics with those of social expenditures 
and poverty risks. A first glance at the employment and unemployment dynamics 
shows that there exists large variation in the rate of change in unemployment (see 
Diagram 3), and not that high in the rate of change in employment, underlying the 
uncertainties and risks attached to labour market developments. Note, for example the 
pick in the unemployment rate in 2002, the year of the introduction of the euro.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: Rate of change in employment and unemployment. 
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In the present analysis the variables of our interest are taken as proportions in terms of 
the four identified social clubs following Espring-Andersen (1990) and Bertola et al. 
(2001). These proportions are then represented in changes so as to be able to estimate 
the underlying distribution dynamics from one social club to another social club, 
referring to an evolving cross-sectional distribution over time and its persistence and 
transition characteristics. 
 
3. BAYESIAN ESTIMATION OF FIRST ORDER MARKOV 
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
 
Given the paucity of disaggregate data, we shall assume that the analyst observes 
only the sample aggregate proportions of objects in each country club for every time 
period t. The probability of the joint event that an object zt falls in two different states, 
si and sj, in two sequential periods as in Christodoulakis (2007), and it is written as 
 
 12 
( ) ( ) ( )itjtititjt szszszszsz ====== −−− 111 |PrPr,Pr                      (1) 
 
which recursively yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ===== −−
i
itjtitjt szszszsz 11 |PrPrPr                         (2) 
The state, si takes the form of four mutually exclusive country clubs, which are the 
Nordic (C1), the Continental (C2), the Anglo-Saxon (C3) and the Southern (C3). We 
are interested in estimating the conditional transition probabilities between social 
clubs, forming the time homogeneous transition probability matrix P. 
 












=
4,43,42,41,4
4,33,32,31,3
4,23,22,21,2
4,13,12,11,1
CCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCC
pppp
pppp
pppp
pppp
P
 
 
The conditional transition probabilities in equation (2) represent the entries of 
a row in matrix P. The stochastic matrix P will be representative of a stochastic 
process only if it is associated to a converging generator matrix G, which is ensured if 
and only if P is diagonal dominant. Therefore, the empirical implementation of the 
transition probability matrix P is subject to constraints, so its entries should be non-
negative, each row sums to unit and every diagonal element exceeds 0.5. 
 
It is now possible to transform the recursive relation (2) into an empirical 
model by replacing the unconditional probabilities with observed aggregate 
proportions jq  and adding a random error term uj. Then, the conditional transition 
probabilities can be treated as unknown parameters βij and equation (2) can be written 
as: 
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         ∑ +=
i
tjij uqq ,β1-i,tj,t                                 (3) 
 
where qj,t is the proportion of value or objects in the class j at time t over total value or 
objects. When a finite time series sample of T observations is available and 
conditional transition probabilities are properly constrained, equation (3) can be 
written as:  
          
ijβ
X
jijj
jjjj
=>≥=
+=
for5.0,0 ,1
s.t.
ββ
uβq
1'
     (4) 
 
where q is a vector of T observations of portfolio returns, X a matrix of T observations 
for K credit quality classes, β  a vector of K conditional transition probabilities, 1  is a 
vector of units  and ),0(~ 2IσNu .  
 
By restating model (4) in deviation form from the k-th country club proportion, we 
effectively impose the equality constraint, so that 
 
                                                 
ijβ
X
*
ji
jj
=>≥
+=
for5.0,0
s.t.
*
*
j
*
j
*
j
β
uβq
                (5) 
 
where the new variables are now expressed in deviation form and the t-th elements are 
given by 1,1,
*
,,
*
 and −− −=−= tktititktt xxxxqq , where i = 1,…,K-1 is the i-th column of 
X. The vector *β  has K-1 elements whilst the K-th beta can now be obtained from the 
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constraint *1 β1'− . All elements of X* are assumed to be independent of each other 
and of 2*  and  , σβu . Then Bayes law states that the posterior density of *β  and 2σ  is:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2***2***2* ,Prior     ,, Likelihood,,Posterior σσσ βqβqβ ×= XX  (6) 
 
where we have dropped the country club subscript j. We follow van Dijk and Kloek 
(1980) and use a prior that is composed of an uninformative component for 2σ  and an 
informative one for *β  which captures our existing knowledge for the parameter 
inequality restrictions. By independence: 
 
( ) ( )*12* ,Prior ββ Τ= −σσ     (7) 
where 
( )


 ≥≤
=Τ
                    otherwise0
0 and 1 if1 *** ββ
β
1'
 
 
Assuming multivariate normality for u and integrating out σ, Christodoulakis (2007) 
follows standard analysis to show that the marginal posterior probability density 
function of vector *β  is a multivariate t with mean zero, variance **2 '
ˆ)2( XXσλ
λ
−
 
and vλ =  degrees of freedom. 
  
Following Kloek and van Dijk (1978), for any function ( ).R , the point estimator of 
( )*βR  is given by: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )∫
∫=
****
*****
***
Posterior
Posterior 
βqβ
βqββ
yβ
dX
dXR
XRE             (10) 
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Estimator (10) can be implemented numerically by using an approximation for the 
posterior distribution, an importance function ( )*Im βp , from which random draws of 
*
β  will be drawn. It can be shown that for **2
*
1 ,...,, Nβββ  being a set of N random 
draws from ( )*Im βp , then:  
 
    
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
***
1
*
****
Im
Posterior 1lim XRE
p
XR
N
N
i i
ii
N
qβ
β
qββ
=∑
=
∞→
            (12) 
 
apart from a normalizing constant which can be calculated separately. In this case our 
estimator is reduced to ( ) ( )*
1
*1
i
N
i
iRN
ββ Τ∑
=
. Thus, our simulation procedure generates 
2
1
*
'
 





+=
ii
i
ww
λ
A izbβ , where b is the least squares estimate, A comes from the 
Cholesky decomposition of the least-squares covariance matrix, z is a K-1 vector of 
standard normal variables and w is a λ vector of standard normal variables Thus our 
parameter estimates can now be obtained using (12) and ( ) ** iiR ββ = .  
 
4. THE DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS  
 In this section we estimate the transition probability matrices with four states, 
corresponding to the EU social clubs as described in Bertola (2006).  Our estimation 
procedure follows the Bayesian approach under inequality contraints, using Monte 
Carlo Integration (MCI). In this respect we produce the entire empirical posterior 
distribution for every transition probability within the transition matrix. In Tables 1 to 
4 we present the transition matrixes for all data sets as formed by the posterior means, 
whilst in Tables A1 to A6 in the Appendix we report the full set of statistics for each 
estimated distribution. Note that the probabilities on the main diagonals show the 
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likelihood of the proportion of the variable under investigation remaining in the same 
club next period. Now, the upper off-diagonal probabilities show the likelihood of 
transition to less generous social security systems that could be seen, if the aim is to 
raise social welfare and thus social expenditure, as a downgrade. Similarly, the lower 
off-diagonal probabilities show the likelihood of transition to more generous social 
security systems, an upgrade in this paper. 
 
In detail, Table 1 shows the transition probability matrix for total public social 
expenditure and social protection benefits as percent of GDP. The elements in the 
main diagonal are estimates of non-transition probabilities, that is the likelihood of 
staying in the same club next period. According to the results for total public social 
expenditure as % of GDP, there is 66 percent probability that the proportional 
expenditure of club 1 remains the same next year, thus showing persistence that is 
similar to the one of club 2. For clubs 3 and 4 the relevant non transition probability is 
lower, 57.6 percent and 57.9 percent respectively, which implies that the proportional 
public social expenditure carries lower persistence for the less generous social 
security systems, i.e. the Southern club and the Anglo-Saxon. The off diagonal matrix 
elements in Table1 are quite substantial in magnitude in the case of transition from 
club 1 to 2 and 4 (P12 = 13.6 percent and P14 = 14.3 percent), from club 2 to 1 (P21 
=16.4 percent), from club 3 to 2 and 4 (P32 =12.8 percent and P34= 19.8 percent), and 
finally from club 4 to 3 (P43 = 24.3 percent). Note the pattern in off diagonal elements 
that emerges as the clubs of the Southern and the Anglo-Saxon appear to exhibit high 
transition probabilities between them, whilst similar high transition probabilities are 
observed between the Nordic and Continental clubs. This pattern could be interpreted 
as essentially a convergence of the four clubs into two that is Nordic with Continental 
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the one club and the Aglo-Saxon with the Southern the other club. Next, if one takes a 
sub-category of public social expenditure that is social protection benefits as percent 
of GDP, non transition and transition probabilities draw a similar picture for the 
convergence into two wider clubs.5 
 
 
 
Table 1. The One-Step Transition Probability Matrix for Social 
Expenditure (% of GDP). 
 
Total Expenditure (% of GDP).  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.662 0.136 0.059 0.143 
C2 0.164 0.653 0.087 0.096 
C3 0.098 0.128 0.576 0.198 
C4 0.086 0.092 0.243 0.579 
 Social Protection Benefits (% of GDP).  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.697 0.138 0.057 0.107 
C2 0.147 0.634 0.118 0.101 
C3 0.097 0.121 0.575 0.206 
C4 0.092 0.149 0.170 0.589 
Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
To enrich our analysis we produce transition probability matrixes for the 
above variables measured as proportions of million euros and of per capita (see Table 
2). A strong pattern that concerns the diagonal elements, i.e. the non-transition 
probabilities, appears on per capita variables, in which the highest value is observed 
for club 3, whereas all the remaining clubs have similar in magnitude persistence. The 
picture for the variables in millions is similar to some extent as the non-transition 
probabilities have little difference between each other, though club 3 remains slightly 
                                               
5
 Note that our approach uncovers the entire empirical posterior distribution of transition probabilities, 
for which statistical inference is reported in the Appendix for all variables. 
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more persistent than the rest. As far as the off diagonal elements is concerned, in 
contrast with the variables as percent of GDP, we observe high transition probabilities 
from clubs with generous social systems (club 1, 2) to less generous ones, whilst the 
reverse is observed for the least generous clubs (club 4, 3) that tend to improve. In 
particular, club 1 transits more to club 2, whereas club 2 transits more to club 4.  
 
 Table 2. The One-Step Transition Probability Matrix for Social 
Expenditure (mil. Euros and per capita). 
 
Total Social Expenditure (mil. euros)  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.565 0.256 0.055 0.124 
C2 0.079 0.569 0.074 0.278 
C3 0.093 0.159 0.593 0.155 
C4 0.102 0.144 0.167 0.587 
Total Social Expenditure (per capita)  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.587 0.280 0.068 0.066 
C2 0.126 0.607 0.081 0.186 
C3 0.178 0.071 0.645 0.105 
C4 0.098 0.127 0.185 0.590 
Social Protection Benefits (mil. euros)  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.565 0.261 0.057 0.117 
C2 0.078 0.566 0.076 0.280 
C3 0.092 0.161 0.593 0.154 
C4 0.092 0.149 0.170 0.589 
Social Protection Benefits (per capita)  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.587 0.287 0.070 0.056 
C2 0.129 0.603 0.083 0.185 
C3 0.176 0.070 0.650 0.104 
C4 0.094 0.127 0.200 0.580 
Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
Table 3 reports the transition probability matrix for a key variable in the core 
of evaluating social policy in EU that is the risk of poverty rate before and after social 
transfers. The main diagonal shows the probability that the proportion of population 
remaining within the same risk of poverty rate club. We observe that the persistence 
of the risk of poverty rate reduces after social transfers only for the generous social 
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systems, in particular for club 1 and less so for club 2. For club 3 and 4, at best the 
probability of risk of poverty rate remains the same after social transfers. This result 
verifies the general belief that traditionally socially minded countries are more 
effective in delivering results in terms of lowering poverty. On the other side, the 
estimated transition probabilities reveal some interesting dynamics. In particular, after 
social transfers people in clubs that are more generous have to fear of facing a higher 
transition probability of getting club 3 and 4 type of poverty.  As it turns out, if you 
are within club 3 (club 4) you face a transition probability after social transfers that 
improves your odds of facing a risk of poverty of type club 2 (club 3). 
 
 Table 3. The One-Step Transition Probability Matrix for Risk of Poverty.  
Risk of poverty rate before social transfers  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.663 0.117 0.134 0.086 
C2 0.074 0.607 0.155 0.165 
C3 0.100 0.155 0.591 0.155 
C4 0.130 0.190 0.095 0.585 
Risk of poverty rate after social transfers  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.593 0.089 0.124 0.195 
C2 0.098 0.584 0.124 0.194 
C3 0.097 0.187 0.600 0.116 
C4 0.106 0.092 0.209 0.594 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
 
Table 4 reports the transition probability matrix for the employment and the 
unemployment rate. It is striking that the persistence in unemployment is higher, 69.3 
percent, for club 4 that is the Anglo-Saxon club, characterized by a highly unregulated 
labor market, in comparison to the persistence for club 1, which includes the Nordic 
countries with highly regulated labor markets. These dynamics shed light on the 
importance to convergence in terms of social cohesion policy within EU if poverty 
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traps were to be avoided. The off diagonal elements show that there are exist high 
transition probabilities from club 3 and club 4 to club 2, whereas club 1 and 2 transit 
to club 3. For the employment, persistence appears to form two major groups of clubs 
that is 3, 4, and 1, 2. Transition probabilities show that club 1 goes to club 2 with a 
27.1 percent probability, whilst the remaining clubs tend to reach 1 with high 
transition probabilities. 
 
Table 4. The One-Step Transition Probability Matrix for Labour. 
Employment  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.610 0.271 0.072 0.047 
C2 0.145 0.599 0.129 0.126 
C3 0.169 0.086 0.657 0.088 
C4 0.142 0.076 0.117 0.665 
Unemployment  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
C1 0.609 0.089 0.210 0.091 
C2 0.108 0.660 0.147 0.085 
C3 0.081 0.179 0.599 0.141 
C4 0.048 0.133 0.126 0.693 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
A relevant question is how fast the actual distribution approaches the steady 
state one. This can be assessed from the system’s ‘half life’ obtained as: 
  
)8(
ln
2ln
2λ
−=hl  
where 2λ is the second eigenvalue of the one-step probability matrix.  
 
Our results are presented in Table 5. The results show a rather fast pace as half 
life ranging from 0.93 years in the case of total social expenditure in million euros to 
1.37 years in the case of social protection benefits as percent of GDP. It is of interest 
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to note that the half life falls if one uses million of euros rather than percent of GDP, 
insinuating that the pace of which the actual distribution approaches the steady state is 
lower if one takes into account also the evolution of GDP, and thus measures the 
dynamics of expenditures in relative terms rather than in absolute terms. Also, note 
that the pace of adjustment is higher for poverty risk after social transfers compared to 
before social transfers, whereas for the labor market the pace for employment is close 
to the one for unemployment.  
Table 5. Half Life to Steady-State Distributions. 
 λ2 Half Life 
Social Expenditure (% GDP)  0.5922 1.3230 
Social Expenditure (mil. euro)  0.4765 0.9351 
Social Protection Benefits (% GDP)  0.6047 1.3780 
Social Protection Benefits (mil. EUR)  0.4588 0.8896 
Risk of Poverty after social transfers  0.4948 0.9851 
Risk of Poverty before social transfers  0.5624 1.2043 
Employment  0.5556 1.1794 
Unemployment  0.5772 1.2613 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on the process of integration some key variables of national 
social welfare policy in EU-15 by estimating the underlying persistence and transition 
probabilities within four social clubs as defined in Espring-Andersen (1990) and 
Bertola et al. (2001). We model the dynamics as a transition probability matrix using 
Markov chains and a Bayesian approach under inequality constraints with Monte 
Carlo Integration (MCI) for proportions of the aggregate data. In this respect our 
approach uncovers the entire empirical posterior distribution of transition 
probabilities.  
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A striking finding that emerges from the transition probability matrix for 
social expenditure as percent of GDP is the convergence of the four social clubs into 
two that is between the Nordic and the Continental club and between the Anglo-
Saxon and the Southern club. The analysis of non transition and transition 
probabilities for a sub-category of the social expenditure, which is the social 
protection benefits as percent of GDP, draw a similar picture, finding some evidence 
of integration dynamics into two wider clubs. For the risk of poverty we observe that 
the persistence reduces after social transfers only for the generous social systems, in 
particular for club 1, which includes Nordic countries, and less so for club 2, which 
includes Continental countries. This result verifies the general belief that traditionally 
socially minded countries are more effective in delivering results in terms of lowering 
poverty. High persistence is also observed regarding unemployment in club 4, the 
Anglo-Saxon club, characterized by a highly unregulated labor market.  Lastly, the 
half life statistics show fast pace across all variables of our interest. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Total Social Expenditure. 
(% of GDP) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.662 0.658 0.089 0.287 -0.500 
P12 0.136 0.127 0.086 0.542 -0.238 
P13 0.059 0.046 0.051 1.603 3.692 
P14 0.143 0.143 0.072 0.310 0.018 
P21 0.164 0.163 0.079 0.178 -0.251 
P22 0.653 0.650 0.084 0.299 -0.401 
P23 0.087 0.076 0.061 0.993 1.141 
P24 0.096 0.093 0.050 0.749 1.396 
P31 0.098 0.081 0.078 1.079 0.954 
P32 0.128 0.116 0.086 0.666 -0.023 
P33 0.576 0.556 0.068 1.357 1.874 
P34 0.198 0.205 0.090 -0.105 -0.544 
P41 0.086 0.066 0.075 1.366 1.656 
P42 0.092 0.060 0.090 1.163 0.707 
P43 0.243 0.249 0.119 -0.222 -0.826 
P44 0.579 0.560 0.069 1.149 0.987 
(mil. Euro) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.565 0.548 0.060 1.732 3.673 
P12 0.256 0.270 0.087 -0.676 0.207 
P13 0.055 0.039 0.053 1.893 5.384 
P14 0.124 0.118 0.074 0.575 0.281 
P21 0.079 0.070 0.061 1.302 2.675 
P22 0.569 0.555 0.058 1.601 3.929 
P23 0.074 0.055 0.066 1.441 2.424 
P24 0.278 0.293 0.082 -0.987 0.997 
P31 0.093 0.078 0.073 1.087 1.043 
P32 0.159 0.157 0.086 0.283 -0.374 
P33 0.593 0.576 0.075 1.186 1.457 
P34 0.155 0.148 0.093 0.413 -0.472 
P41 0.102 0.082 0.084 1.058 0.569 
P42 0.144 0.129 0.096 0.531 -0.462 
P43 0.167 0.161 0.099 0.305 -0.827 
P44 0.587 0.562 0.080 1.357 1.547 
(per capita) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.587 0.566 0.075 1.369 1.887 
P12 0.280 0.301 0.103 -0.705 -0.203 
P13 0.068 0.052 0.060 1.601 3.144 
P14 0.066 0.055 0.051 1.561 3.665 
P21 0.126 0.113 0.087 0.642 -0.187 
P22 0.607 0.591 0.081 0.886 0.335 
P23 0.081 0.061 0.072 1.391 1.929 
P24 0.186 0.192 0.089 -0.023 -0.537 
P31 0.178 0.163 0.113 0.348 -0.848 
P32 0.071 0.052 0.068 1.665 3.336 
P33 0.645 0.624 0.103 0.605 -0.530 
P34 0.105 0.087 0.082 1.075 0.872 
P41 0.098 0.089 0.074 0.777 -0.183 
P42 0.127 0.109 0.087 0.892 0.470 
P43 0.185 0.191 0.111 0.367 -0.437 
P44 0.590 0.567 0.077 1.688 3.429 
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Table A2: Social Protection Benefit. 
(% GDP) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.697 0.701 0.094 -0.022 -0.647 
P12 0.138 0.129 0.086 0.565 -0.155 
P13 0.057 0.044 0.051 1.646 3.813 
P14 0.107 0.101 0.064 0.751 0.785 
P21 0.147 0.145 0.077 0.334 -0.164 
P22 0.634 0.625 0.083 0.536 -0.190 
P23 0.118 0.114 0.068 0.559 0.272 
P24 0.101 0.097 0.054 0.691 1.119 
P31 0.097 0.076 0.080 1.154 1.084 
P32 0.121 0.106 0.088 0.838 0.360 
P33 0.575 0.555 0.066 1.531 2.900 
P34 0.206 0.212 0.099 -0.102 -0.694 
P41 0.092 0.073 0.080 1.285 1.836 
P42 0.149 0.147 0.090 0.459 -0.247 
P43 0.170 0.167 0.101 0.275 -0.690 
P44 0.589 0.564 0.078 1.277 1.439 
(mil. Euro) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.565 0.548 0.060 1.725 3.811 
P12 0.261 0.276 0.084 -0.786 0.507 
P13 0.057 0.043 0.052 1.829 4.846 
P14 0.117 0.112 0.070 0.702 0.706 
P21 0.078 0.069 0.057 0.966 1.030 
P22 0.566 0.554 0.053 1.325 2.457 
P23 0.076 0.055 0.069 1.514 2.729 
P24 0.280 0.295 0.081 -1.063 1.186 
P31 0.092 0.074 0.073 1.137 1.244 
P32 0.161 0.160 0.085 0.247 -0.347 
P33 0.593 0.576 0.073 1.142 1.311 
P34 0.154 0.147 0.093 0.405 -0.426 
P41 0.092 0.073 0.080 1.285 1.836 
P42 0.149 0.147 0.090 0.459 -0.247 
P43 0.170 0.167 0.101 0.275 -0.690 
P44 0.589 0.564 0.078 1.277 1.439 
(per capita) mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.587 0.566 0.075 1.392 2.027 
P12 0.287 0.308 0.102 -0.782 -0.027 
P13 0.070 0.055 0.060 1.499 2.786 
P14 0.056 0.045 0.048 1.842 5.304 
P21 0.129 0.116 0.087 0.644 -0.161 
P22 0.603 0.588 0.077 0.986 0.816 
P23 0.083 0.062 0.073 1.452 2.357 
P24 0.185 0.189 0.091 -0.005 -0.621 
P31 0.176 0.167 0.109 0.291 -0.828 
P32 0.070 0.049 0.066 1.572 2.749 
P33 0.650 0.637 0.102 0.549 -0.493 
P34 0.104 0.088 0.077 1.020 0.908 
P41 0.094 0.087 0.080 1.022 0.402 
P42 0.127 0.099 0.097 0.931 0.076 
P43 0.200 0.192 0.121 0.227 -1.095 
P44 0.580 0.559 0.073 1.914 4.269 
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Table A3: Poverty before social transfers. 
 
 mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.593 0.571 0.080 1.171 1.149 
P12 0.089 0.069 0.076 1.313 1.807 
P13 0.124 0.103 0.092 0.919 0.317 
P14 0.195 0.195 0.108 0.085 -0.858 
P21 0.098 0.079 0.080 1.196 1.423 
P22 0.584 0.563 0.067 0.954 0.280 
P23 0.124 0.096 0.097 0.864 -0.114 
P24 0.194 0.188 0.112 0.234 -0.744 
P31 0.097 0.075 0.081 1.030 0.393 
P32 0.187 0.173 0.112 0.351 -0.709 
P33 0.600 0.578 0.081 1.248 1.418 
P34 0.116 0.099 0.085 0.821 0.167 
P41 0.106 0.078 0.087 1.109 0.946 
P42 0.092 0.075 0.077 0.980 0.201 
P43 0.209 0.220 0.124 0.032 -1.136 
P44 0.594 0.572 0.082 1.105 0.682 
 
Table A4: Poverty after social transfers  
 
 mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.663 0.660 0.089 0.161 -0.741 
P12 0.117 0.127 0.074 0.486 -0.011 
P13 0.134 0.120 0.106 0.853 -0.312 
P14 0.086 0.063 0.080 1.550 1.591 
P21 0.074 0.055 0.067 1.241 1.324 
P22 0.607 0.583 0.090 1.262 1.306 
P23 0.155 0.132 0.109 0.600 -0.513 
P24 0.165 0.158 0.104 0.367 -0.672 
P31 0.100 0.087 0.077 0.957 0.574 
P32 0.155 0.145 0.105 0.617 -0.153 
P33 0.591 0.569 0.080 1.399 2.229 
P34 0.155 0.148 0.098 0.447 -0.389 
P41 0.130 0.126 0.072 0.498 0.171 
P42 0.190 0.192 0.101 0.049 -0.808 
P43 0.095 0.079 0.074 1.082 1.096 
P44 0.585 0.568 0.067 1.174 1.326 
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Table A5: Employment. 
 
 mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.610 0.590 0.086 1.005 0.567 
P12 0.271 0.289 0.115 -0.435 -0.707 
P13 0.072 0.053 0.064 1.550 2.782 
P14 0.047 0.034 0.045 1.860 5.038 
P21 0.145 0.140 0.084 0.415 -0.267 
P22 0.599 0.582 0.076 1.007 0.727 
P23 0.129 0.126 0.069 0.453 0.172 
P24 0.126 0.124 0.070 0.450 0.087 
P31 0.169 0.169 0.087 0.142 -0.543 
P32 0.086 0.069 0.072 1.228 1.506 
P33 0.657 0.652 0.087 0.366 -0.378 
P34 0.088 0.083 0.052 0.886 1.675 
P41 0.142 0.133 0.086 0.551 -0.113 
P42 0.076 0.059 0.065 1.380 2.138 
P43 0.117 0.118 0.053 0.301 0.671 
P44 0.665 0.669 0.078 -0.013 -0.486 
 
Table A6: Unemployment. 
 
 mean median Std. Skew. Kurt. 
P11 0.609 0.591 0.082 0.927 0.409 
P12 0.089 0.068 0.078 1.258 1.406 
P13 0.210 0.210 0.116 0.043 -0.933 
P14 0.091 0.079 0.067 1.078 1.323 
P21 0.108 0.107 0.053 0.543 1.167 
P22 0.660 0.659 0.082 0.229 -0.369 
P23 0.147 0.144 0.077 0.310 -0.242 
P24 0.085 0.074 0.061 1.124 1.631 
P31 0.081 0.070 0.059 1.204 1.923 
P32 0.179 0.182 0.092 0.050 -0.659 
P33 0.599 0.583 0.075 1.001 0.764 
P34 0.141 0.139 0.072 0.345 0.000 
P41 0.048 0.034 0.046 1.882 5.036 
P42 0.133 0.118 0.092 0.709 -0.073 
P43 0.126 0.124 0.067 0.475 0.387 
P44 0.693 0.698 0.093 -0.054 -0.662 
 
